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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 960375-CA

v.
Priority No.

2

RAYMOND PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises from convictions for distribution of a
controlled substances within 100 feet of a church, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)
(1995), and distribution of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii)
(1995).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit plain error in allowing the

State or any of the State's witnesses to comment on the
confidential informant's credibility in the face of defendant's
failure to object?

As a general rule, appellate courts will not

consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, unless the
trial court committed plain error or the case involves

exceptional circumstances.

See, e,g,. State V, Cook, 881 P.2d

913# 914 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359
(Utah App. 1993).

Because defendant failed to object, the issues

of error, obviousness of error, and prejudice, see State v. Dunn.
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993), are matters of law for this
Court to decide.
2.

Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel

when his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's
remarks in opening statement, or any of the State's witnesses'
comments, regarding the confidential informant's supplying "good
information" in prior drug cases?

"When . . . the claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal, [the appellate court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter of
law."

State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994).

In order

to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish (1) that his counsels performance "fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

Id. at (citing

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064 (1984)) .

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence
in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASS
Defendant was charged by information with distribution of a
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church, a second
degree felony (Count I), and with distribution of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony (Count II) (R. 1-2). A jury
found defendant guilty of both counts (R. 76-77).

The trial

court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of one-tofifteen years and zero-to-five years (R. 81).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January 1995, after Adam Black had left prison and was on
parole, he began giving his parole officer information about
other parolees who were violating their parole and committing
crimes (R. 190, 192). After Black's information lead to several
arrests, the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force began using him
as an confidential informant (R. 192-93, 198). After his release

3

from prison, Black become reacquainted with defendant, whom he
recognized from the Utah State Prison (R. 330-31, 390-91, 397) .
Black would see defendant daily at the Red Duck, a convenience
store where Black worked and where defendant frequently shopped
(R. 337, 541)• Black and defendant became friends and Black
visited defendant's apartment on several occasions (R. 350, 40102, 542, 562) .
After defendant offered to sell Black drugs, Black informed
his parole officer, Blake Woodring (R. 196, 340) . Woodring
contacted the Weber-Morgan Strike Force and arranged to use Black
as a confidential informant to purchase narcotics from defendant
(R. 193, 477).
On October 26, 1995, Black, fitted with a wire transmitter,
attempted to purchase narcotics from defendant.

However,

defendant declined to make a sale on that occasion because
officers were executing a search warrant for drugs at a house
across the street (R. 345, 349, 399, 488) . Defendant told Black
there was "too much heat" and to come back later (R. 349, 489).1
On October 30, 1995, a controlled buy was arranged and

1

Officer Lyle Bayless monitored the conversation between
defendant and Black on October 26, 1995 (R. 487-89). Although he
did not then know defendant, the voice he heard was similar to
defendant's (R. 489).
4

completed between Black and defendant at defendant's apartment
(R. 350). Before heading up to defendant's apartment, Black
stopped to tell some individuals in the parking lot that he was
going to buy some marijuana from defendant (R. 360). An
unidentified male answered when Black knocked on defendant's
door.

Black asked for defendant and was invited into defendant's

apartment (R. 299). Black had a brief conversation with this man
about buying some stolen stereos (R. 362) . After a couple of
minutes, defendant appeared and Black asked him if he had his
"stuff" (R. 300). Defendant responded that he did and then left
to retrieve two bags of marijuana (R. 300, 363-64) . Black
briefly squabbled with defendant about the marijuana not
amounting to an ounce (R. 364) . Once satisfied there was indeed
an ounce divided between the two bags, Black handed defendant
$250 for the drugs (R. 364). When asked by Black if he could get
more drugs "real quick," defendant said wyes" (R. 365). Officers
Laplant and Elliott, who had earlier fitted defendant with a wire
transmitter and watched him approach defendant's apartment,
monitored this conversation (R. 260-65, 295-300).

The distance

from defendant's apartment and the First Baptist Church was later
measured and determined to be to 472 feet (R. 461).
On November 13, 1995, a second controlled exchange between
5

Black and defendant took place (R. 368) . Black called Agent
Bayless that afternoon and told him he had arranged a buy at the
Red Duck with defendant (R. 369, 493) . However, when Bayless
came into the store, at just about the time the buy was supposed
to take place, defendant, who had been standing around outside,
came into the store too (R. 305, 371, 494). Black pretended that
Bayless was an electrician who was there to fix some lights so
that Bayless could search Black and wire him in the back room (R.
372, 494-96).
After both Bayless and a customer left, defendant came up to
Black and said: *I got it."

(R. 377, 502). Black confirmed that

defendant had an ounce of marijuana and a quarter gram of cocaine
(R. 213, 307, 377, 502). Defendant then handed a sock to Black
which defendant said contained the drugs (R. 378). Black did not
look into the sock at that time but felt something resembling a
bag of marijuana inside (R. 378-79).

Black paid defendant $250

or $260 for the narcotics (R. 378, 432-33).

Defendant left the

store and went up the hill to his apartment (R. 308, 502).
After defendant left, Black looked into the sock and found
the cocaine was missing (R. 310, 381). He told one of the people
hanging around outside the store to go get defendant (R. 216,
311, 383, 505). Defendant came in and insisted he put the
6

cocaine on the counter, but they could not find it (R. 219-20,
312, 385, 507) . Defendant promised to "take care of him" (R.
313, 326, 385), and in fact, brought Black a quarter gram of
cocaine the following Saturday (R. 222, 387).
Officers Bayless, Laplant, and Woodring listened to the
entire transaction between defendant and Black (R. 206-07, 500,
502, 524). In addition, all three of the officers could view the
store from their vantage points (R. 206-07, 502, 522).
Prior to each buy, Black was searched to ensure he did not
have any drugs in his possession and all of his money was taken
(R. 87, 256, 292-93, 358, 487, 496). Following the second buy,
Black was also given a surprise urine analysis test to ensure he
was not using drugs (R. 222, 509). The results were negative (R.
222, 509).
Defendant testified that although he knew Black, he did not
sell any drugs to Black on either occasion (R. 545, 553-55) .
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT

There was no plain error in the trial court's allowing the
prosecutor to comment on the confidential informant's credibility
in opening statement or to elicit testimony supporting the
informant's credibility on direct examination.
7

The prosecutor is permitted to present to the jury in
opening argument an unargumentative overview of the evidence,
which the prosecutor did by accurately referencing testimony
elicited in direct examination.

That testimony was properly

elicited because defendant attacked the informant's credibility
in his opening statement, a circumstance placing this case
outside the prohibitions of rule 608(a)(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence, and distinguishing it case from State v. Hovater, 914
P.2d 37 (Utah 1996), upon which defendant relies exclusively.
Even if the prosecutor's comment's in opening statement
amounted to bolstering, such commentary was not improper in the
circumstances of this case, based on the majority view in the
federal circuits applying rule 608(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

Specifically, the prosecutor's remarks in opening

statement simply anticipated an inevitable attack on the
informant's credibility, an event fully realized in defendant's
opening and closing statements and through cross examination.
Because Hovater is not expressly on point and because the
opinion was only issued five days prior to trial in this case,
any error in the trial court's failing to follow it in this case
could not have been obvious.

In any case, because of the

compelling evidence of defendant's guilt independent of the

8

informant's testimony, any error was harmless.

POINT II
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel was
ineffective.

Because there was no error in the trial court's

allowing the prosecutor to comment or witnesses to testify about
the confidential informant's credibility, any objection would
likely have been denied.

Thus, defense counsel's failure to

object cannot be considered deficient perfonnance.

Additionally,

because there was compelling evidence of defendant's guilt
independent of the informant's testimony, defendant was not
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's
remarks or the witnesses' testimony.

ARgVMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR. NOT
ONLY DID THE STATE NOT IMPROPERLY BOLSTER THE
CREDIBILITY OF ITS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT IN EITHER
OPENING ARGUMENT OR DURING THE TESTIMONY OF ITS FIRST
WITNESSES, BUT ALSO ANY ERROR WAS NEITHER OBVIOUS NOR
PREJUDICIAL.
At trial, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's
supporting the credibility of the State's confidential informant.
On appeal, defendant now argues that, in violation of rule
608(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence and State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d

9

37 (Utah 1996), the trial court committed plain error in allowing
the prosecutor to improperly bolster Adam Black's credibility in
its opening statement and during direct testimony of its initial
witnesses.

Appellant's Br. at 8-14.

The argument is without

merit.
In order to establish plain error and to obtain appellate
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to,
"the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant."

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)

(citations omitted).

If defendant fails to prove any one of

these requirements, plain error is not established.

Id. at 1209

(citations omitted).
A.

The Prosecutor did not Improperly Bolster.

Defendant argues that the State immediately starting
bolstering Black's credibility in its opening statement, in
violation of Rule 608(a) (2)2 and Hovater. Appellant's Br. at 9-

2

Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part: w[E]vidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked has been attacked by
opinion evidence or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(2).
10

11.

Defendant, however, misapprehends the appropriate reach of

opening argument.

In its opening statement, the State did not

improperly bolster Black's character for truthfulness but merely
provided the jury with an overview of the facts the State
intended to prove during its case-in-chief.
In an opening statement, a party should "give the jury an
unargumentative overview of the facts the party intends to
prove."

State V, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988)

(citing State v, Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1982)), cert.

denial, Cook v. Lafferty, 504 u.s. 911, 112 s.ct. 1942 (1992);
Rank v. State. 883 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Ark. 1994) (because evidence
gave way to inference that the defendant's statement was false,
prosecutor was entitled to refer to it during opening statement).
This is precisely what the prosecutor did when he explained that
Black had given officers good information on a number of
occasions which had eventually lead to arrests (See R. 163-65 for
pertinent portion of opening statement; attached at Appendix A ) .
Indeed, this information was later proven through the testimony
of Officers Woodring and Laplant during the State's case without
challenge to its accuracy (R. 190-92, Appendix B; 314-315,

11

Appendix C, respectively).3
Thus, the central question is whether the prosecutor's
remarks properly referenced properly admitted evidence.
Defendant relies exclusively on Hovater in support of his claims
that the prosecutor improperly bolstered Black's character for
truthfulness in both opening argument and in direct examination.
In Hovater. a police officer used an informant to purchase
drugs from Hovater.

Hovater. 914 P.2d at 38-39.

On direct

examination the officer testified that the informant had assisted
him on a number of buys, seven of which had resulted in guilty
pleas without any suggestion that the informant had planted drugs
on those convicted.

Id. at 40. Hovater's trial attorney did not

object to the examination, but on appeal Hovater's counsel argued
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Id. at 41.

Specifically, Hovater claimed that the prosecutor had improperly
3

Compare Williams, wherein the court also stated: *It is
not proper to engage in anticipatory rebuttal or to argue
credibility by referring to impeachment evidence the other side
may adduce." Williams, 656 P.2d at 452. In Williams, the
prosecutor commented in opening argument that the defendant's
companion during the offense had been coerced into signing
statements stating that the defendant was not involved in the
robbery. Id. at 452. The prosecutor's remarks about the
statements were apparently offered to blunt the anticipated
impeachment of defendant's companion. Id. In contradistinction
to this case, however, the neither the State nor the defendant
actually put in evidence the challenged written statements. Id.
12

bolstered the informant's credibility before

his character for

truthfulness had been impugned, in violation of rule 608(a) (2).
Id.

The State responded that Hovater had attacked the

informant's credibility in opening argument,

id.

In reversing Hovater's conviction, the Utah Supreme Court
first recognized that *a number of jurisdictions with similarly
worded rules have held that bolstering evidence is admissible
following an attorney's disparagement of a witness's credibility
during the attorney's opening argument," citing cases from
federal4 and state jurisdictions.

Hovater. 914 P.2d at 41.5 The

court found that Hovater's opening statement did not attack the
informant's credibility for truthfulness.

However, without

disapproving of the authority it had previously cited, the court
chose not to decide whether the Utah rule should be construed
consistent with that authority.

Rather, the court held that the

4

Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, is the federal
rule verbatim. Utah R. Evid. 608 advisory committee note.
5

£&£ id*, at 41 (citing United States v. Cruz. 805 F.2d

1464, 1480 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones. 763 F.2d
518, 522 (2d Cir. 1985); State v. Van Per Hgyden. 615 A.2d 1246,
1249 (N.H. 1992); People v. Cherry. 554 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885
(1990)).
13

prosecutor had violated rule 608(b), by bolstering6 the
informant's credibility on direct examination with specific
instances of conduct.

Id. at 41-42,

However, the court

ultimately held that the error was harmless because there was
sufficient evidence to convict Hovater entirely apart from the
informant's testimony.

Id. at 43.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, Hovater is not apposite
to this case.

First, defendant's claim of error in this case is

based exclusively on rule 608(a)(2).

However, Hovater's

discussion of rule 608(a) is only dictum, since that case was
decided exclusively on the authority of rule 608(b).

Therefore,

the court's determination of error does not apply to this case.
However, even if dictum in Hovater. permitting bolstering
following attack in opening argument, were the rule of law, the
facts in Hovater would not lead to the same conclusion in this
case.

In Hovater. the court concluded that bolstering the

informant would be improper because he was not first attacked in
Hovater's opening argument.

In this case, bolstering of Black's

6

The court merely assumed that the officer's testimony
constituted ''bolstering," without analysis. Id. at 43. The
State concedes that testimony elicited from Officers Woodring and
Laplant on direct examination about Black's useful information,
and the prosecutor's brief synopsis of such testimony in opening,
was substantially the same as the officer's in Hovater.
14

character for truthfulness at this point was permissible since
the resuscitating provision of Rule 608 had been triggered during
defendant's opening argument.

Rule 608 permits the introduction

of truthful character once the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked.

In his opening statement,

defense counsel repeatedly made personal attacks on Black's
credibility (See R. 179-85 for pertinent portion of opening
statement; attached at Appendix D).

He stated:

Who do you want to believe, the confidential informant
who has been in prison? (R. 180).
[W]hat he is getting in return is 'getting restitution
paid off, is getting off parole, those types of things
are things in return. ... Those are reasons why this
confidential informant, who hasn't had an honest
background, would have possibly to say and do these
things, because of the convenience that presented itself
(R. 181-82).
So again, it comes down to whether this confidential
informant is actually telling the truth. ... What if he
was in there and was to get the drugs from someone else
and come out and say he got them from Mr. Perez or
another individual? (R. 182).
So again we are left to listen to Mr. -- to the
confidential informant and trust what he says. And is
he someone that we want to trust, and want to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that this is the way it
happened? (R. 184).

These statements were sufficient to trigger rule 608 and

15

allow the State to resuscitate Black's credibility.7

Therefore,

it would not have been error to allow Blake Woodring or Rodney
Laplant to testify as to defendant's character for truthfulness,
although neither in fact did.
Finally, defendant notes that the Hovater court warned this
prosecutor that bolstering by use of specific instances of
conduct of a witness may not be proven by extrinsic evidence.
Appellant's Br. at 10. However, this Court should not consider
on appeal whether the State improperly offered extrinsic evidence
to support Black's credibility in violation of rule 608(b)
because defendant has not properly raised that issue.

Defendant

makes a passing reference to this portion of the court's holding
in Hovater and does not specifically allege anywhere in his brief
that the State improperly elicited extrinsic evidence about
specific instances of Black's conduct.

See State v. Amicone. 689

P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider issue when no
legal analysis has been made); State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602

7

Cf. e.g.. ££UZL, 805 F.2d at 1480 (allowing prosecutor to
bolster witnesses' credibility after defense counsel, during
opening argument, asserted government's witnesses could not be
trusted); Jones. 763 F.2d at 522 (allowing prosecutor to
rehabilitate witnesses on direct examination after defense
counsel, in opening statement, accused one witness of previously
committing perjury and questioned whether government witnesses
had simply wmade a deal to save their own hide").
16

(Utah App. 1992) ("This court has routinely declined to consider
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal.").

This

issue is therefore not properly before this Court.
Even if the prosecutor's remarks in opening argument and
Officers Woodring's and Laplant's testimony about Black's "good
information" constituted "bolstering," those references were
proper in the context of all the circumstances.

Even though the

question has not been decided in Utah, see Hovater. 914 P.2d at
41, where the bolstering material also contains the basis for the
opposing party's impeachment, admission of the evidence has
generally been upheld.

See United States v. Lord. 907 F.2d 1028,

1029-31 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find plain error and
following "the majority of circuits [which] allow the government
to admit evidence of the truthfulness provisions of an agreement
on direct examination of a witness, prior to any challenge to the
witness's credibility," under rule 608(a)(2) because "evidence
concerning a plea agreement and its provisions may have both a
bolstering and an impeaching effect on the witness's
credibility); United States v. Oxman. 740 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (3d
Cir. 1984) (upholding claimed instances of vouching on direct
examination since the government could reasonably anticipate
impeachment), vacated on other grounds. 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct.
17

3550 (1985); United States v. Townsend. 796 F.2d 158, 162-63 (6th

Cir. 1986) (no error in introducing cooperating witness's entire
plea agreement, containing promises to testify truthfully, upon
which the witness's credibility could both be bolstered and

impeached).

&££ also United States v, Kramer/ 7ii F.2d 789, 795

(7th Cir. 1983) (not improper for the prosecutor to discuss
during opening and closing arguments conditions that support the
credibility of its witnesses).8
The holdings in these cases are based on the policy of rule
608(a)(2).

In United States v. Bowie, the court noted:

"Fed. R.

Evid. 608(a)(2) seems primarily concerned with saving time and

simplifying trials; unless there is a specfic reason to believe
otherwise, we can safely presume that witnesses tell the truth."
United States v. Bowie. 892 F.2d 1494, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).

However, where it is apparent that the

witness's credibility will be challenged, time is not wasted, nor
8

Alternatively, at least one court has found, without
independent consideration of the evidence supporting guilt, that
although the government's introduction of a cooperation agreement
on direct examination of its principal witness was error, the
error was harmless because of the inevitability of an attack on
the witness's credibility based on his obvious motivation to lie,
a point which was brought to the jury's attention in the
defendant's opening and closing statements and through vigorous
cross examination. See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo. 580 F.2d
1137, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1978).
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is the trial complicated by allowing the prosecutor to
preemptively comment on the witness's credibility.
In this case the basis for impeachment was explicit in the
prosecutor's and witnesses' references to Black, and defendant's
anticipated impeachment of Black was obvious.

The prosecutor

stated that Black had been in prison, that he was on parole
during the events at issue, and that he accepted police payment
for his remaining restitution and for relocation, all prime bases
for impeachment (R. 163-66).

Defendant amply exploited every

opportunity to impeach Black's credibility on each of these
points in opening statement (R. 180-85) , in cross examining
Officer Woodring and Black himself (R. 224-227, 390-97), in his
own testimony (R. 538-40), and in his closing argument (R. 598601).

Indeed, as the prosecutor noted, the entire defense was

based on the theory that Black *set [defendant] up" (R. 617), and
accordingly, defendant thoroughly attacked Black's credibility.
In these circumstances, it was not error either to allow the
prosecutor to modestly comment on Black's credibility in opening
statement or admit the officers' testimony about Black's "good
information".9

9

Compare Williams, where, in contradistinction to this
case, the supreme court found objectionable the prosecutor's
19

In sum, the prosecutor did not improperly bolster Black's
character for truthfulness during opening argument, but merely
provided the jury with an overview of the testimony properly
elicited from Officers Woodring and Laplant.

Further, that

testimony was elicited after defendant undeniably attacked
Black's character for truthfulness in opening argument, in
circumstances where impeachment could reasonably be anticipated
based on Black's background and acceptance of benefits in
exchange for information.

Thus, there was no error in the trial

court's allowing the prosecutor's comments in opening argument or
the officers' testimony regarding the accuracy of Black's
information.
B.

Even If there was Error, it was not Obvious.

Defendant also claims that the alleged errors should have
been obvious to the trial court because the prosecutor's comments
during opening statement *were clearly intended to prove that
Adam Black was a truthful person."

Appellant's Br. at 11.

Defendant also argues that the trial court.should have been
particularly aware that these statements were impermissible since

anticipatory rebuttal of defense evidence which the defense never
introduced or relied on in impeaching the witness's testimony.
Williams^ 656 p.2d at 452.
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it had been "warned by the Supreme Court in Hovater only five
days earlier."

Id.

However, the short period of time that elapsed between the
release of theftovaterslip opinion and the start of defendant's
trial does not make the alleged error more obvious but in fact
tends to mitigate against a finding of obviousness.

The Hovater

decision was released a mere five days before the start of
defendant's trial and its holding was dealt only with the
admissibility of specific instances of conduct under Rule 608(b),
not at issue here.10

Thus, if the prosecutor did improperly

bolster Black's credibility, the error cannot be regarded as
sufficiently obvious so as to trigger application of the plain
error rule.
C.

Because Evidence of Defendant's Guilt was Compelling
Even Without the Confidential Informant's Testimony.
Any Error in Bolstering was, at Most. Harmless,

Finally, defendant asserts the prosecutor's alleged errors
were "extremely prejudicial" to defendant and "cannot be said to
have been harmless."

Appellant's Br. at 13-14.

10

He specifically

Defendant also claims the alleged error should have
been obvious to Mr. Daines who was the prosecutor in Hovater.
Appellant's Br. at 11. Yet, the relevant test is whether the
error was obvious to the trial
court.
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1208. It is thus irrelevant whether the prosecutor was aware of
any error.

21

claims

that the prosecutor's statements wgave undue weight" to

Black's testimony, and without that information, "the jury was
left only with the word of an ex-convict."
18.

Appellant's Br. at

Defendant further suggests there was ua lack of

corroborating evidence on at least one of the convictions."

Id.

Not only has defendant failed to show that, absent this
alleged error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome, but his claims that Black's testimony was
uncorroborated are wholly unsupported by the record.

The record

reveals the case against defendant was based upon the testimony
of Black as well as Officers Woodring, Elliott, Laplant, and
Bayless, all of whom corroborated Black's testimony.

Even

without Black's testimony, the jury had compelling evidence to
convict defendant on the basis of the officers' testimony along
with expert testimony from Arthur Terkelson that the substances
received from defendant were marijuana.

See Hovater. 914 P.2d at

43 (finding jury had enough evidence to convict defendant without
the confidential informant's testimony).
Agent Laplant, who was positioned at a different location,
was able to hear most of the conversation between defendant and
Black (R. 294). Agent Laplant, Blake Woodring's partner, had
done several curfew checks on defendant with Woodring and had
22

also talked to defendant a couple of times at the Adult Probation
& Parole Office (R. 290). Agent Laplant had no trouble
recognizing defendant's voice over the transmitter (R. 299).
Laplant heard Black ask defendant if he had "his stuff," and
defendant responded that he did (R. 300)•

There was wno question

whatsoever" in Officer Laplant's mind that it was defendant's
voice he heard (R. 300); he was na hundred percent sure" (R.
322) .
Officer Bayless, Black's controlling agent on the Strike
Force, testified about the second buy that was arranged between
Black and defendant on November 13, 1995 (R. 493). From where he
was positioned in the alley, Officer Bayless could see defendant
in the store (R. 522). He also heard the conversation between
Black and defendant on a receiver in his truck (R. 502) . He
noted the person speaking to Black was the same person that he
had just seen speaking to Black in the store (R. 502), and the
same person Black had identified as Raymond Perez, the defendant
(R. 494). There was no question in Bayless's mind it was the
same voice (R. 502) -11 He heard Black ask defendant if he had

11

After the buy, when Black discovered that the cocaine
was missing and defendant came back down to the store to look for
the missing crank, Bayless heard defendant's voice again (R.
507)• Again, he was sure it was the same voice (R. 507).
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"the stuff"; defendant said "yeah"; Black asked if it was an
ounce of marijuana and a quarter gram of crank, and defendant
said it was (R. 502). Bayless then visually observed defendant
leave the store (R. 502).
Agent Laplant was also involved with the second buy at the
Red Duck (R. 304). Agent Laplant easily identified defendant
when he entered the store just prior to the transaction (R. 3 05,
323).

Laplant also distinctly heard the conversation between

Black and defendant (R. 317). He heard Black ask defendant if he
had "the stuff," and defendant said he had an ounce of marijuana
and a gram of coke (R. 307). Laplant recognized the defendant's
voice and noted it was the same voice he had heard on October 30,
1995 during the first buy (R. 307).
Finally, Agent Woodring corroborated Black's testimony.
Woodring was defendant's parole officer and accordingly, knew
defendant well and could easily recognize his voice (R. 194-96).
Agents Woodring and Laplant observed the second transaction from
outside the Red Duck and listened to defendant's conversation
with Black over the wire attached to Black (R. 206-07).

Woodring

was certain he heard defendant's voice on the bug (R. 212). He
heard defendant say he had "the stuff," which was a quarter gram
of cocaine and an ounce of marijuana (R. 213). There was no
24

question in Woodring's mind it was defendant's voice he heard (R.
213, 220, 239, 246). In addition, Woodring got a full view of
defendant and positively identified him (R. 213). He was uone
hundred percent sure" it was defendant he saw exit the store
following the buy (R. 246).
In sum, there was compelling evidence for the jury to find
defendant guilty absent any alleged error.

Black's testimony was

corroborated by four other officers, all of whom were involved in
at least one of the transactions.

Defendant has not made the

requisite showing of prejudice and thus cannot prevail on his
plain error claim.

See Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209 ("If any one of

these requirements is not met, plain error is not established.").

POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
Defendant also claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel's failure to object to "the blatant bolstering of the
confidential informant's truthfulness" prejudiced him.
Appellant's Br. at 15-18.
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v.
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Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The defendant must

first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness."

Id. at 186.

This

requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious that he
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.

Id.

Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

Id. 186-87. The defendant has the

burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland
test.

Id. at 186.

Defendant has failed to carry the burden with

respect to both of these parts.
As demonstrated above in the plain error analysis, defendant
cannot establish prejudice under the second prong of the
Strickland test.
2064 (1984).

£&£ Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

Defendant has not shown there was a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent his trial counsel's
failure to object to the State's alleged bolstering, and the
record contains compelling evidence of defendant's guilt.
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Nor

can defendant meet the first part of the Strickland test, since
his trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
at 2064.

See 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct.

Had defendant's trial counsel objected to the State's

alleged bolstering, such an objection, as discussed in Point 1(A)
of this brief, would likely have been overruled.

*[T]he failure

of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."

Codianna v.

Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v.
Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)).. Certainly, the question
of whether an objection was proper here is sufficiently close
that failing to object or simply choosing not to object does not
fall below "an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment."

State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993).
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the State requests that this Court
find defendant's claims without merit and affirm his convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7~C

day of April, 1997.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

The State's Opening Argument

be unusual tor me or my witnesses

to run into one of you.

It

we appear to be avoiding you like the plague, that's because
we are supposed to be doing that.

That has nothing to do with)

what we think about you. And during the course of the
proceedings here there will be times that we will take breaks
during the middle of the day.
7

There is only one door in and

out of here, so please just look upon it that way, and we will!

8

I try to move through it as quickly as we can so we will get you]

9

" out as quickly as we can.

10

In January of 1995 a young man by the name of Adam Black,

JJ

who was the undercover agent in this case, was on parole out

12

of the Utah State Prison to a parole officer by the name of

13

Blake Woodring who works here in Ogden right across the street]

14

in the State Building for the Adult Parole and Probation

15

department.

16

parole.

17

Duck, for those of you who may not know where this particular

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

He went to him and he said, look, I am out on

I am working up the street at the Red Duck.

The Red

Red Duck is, is on the corner of Adams and 26th Street.
kind of sits on the hill.

It isn»t on the street.

It

And it

sits kitty-cornered to the edge of Adams and 26th Street.
He said I am up in this store. A lot of people are
beginning to approach me and doing various things and offering]
to sell me stolen property, offering to sell me drugs. And by]
the way, there is some guy up there running around right now
who I think is trying to palm forged checks off on me.
65
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Blake Woodring asked him about the last of the matters,
who is this guy?

Can you help us with him?

With no agreement]

for him to be an undercover gent or anything, he simply gave
the parole department the information about this person from
Oregon who was passing bad checks. As it turns out, he is a
person who was wanted in three different states, and has been
convicted of 11 separate counts of forgery in three different
8

9
10
11

I states. And ended up getting Blake Woodring a medal from the
Department of Corrections over his assistance in catching this]
guy.

That's how the Parole Department found out about him.
And then subsequently, or after that, the Weber-Morgan

12

Narcotics Strike force became acquainted with Adam Black's

13

ability as an undercover agent.

14

prison.

15

he knows this Defendant.

16

living in an apartment right next door to the Red Duck when

17

Adam Black was working there. That's how this case arises.

18

Adam Black has been in

He was in prison with this Defendant.

And that's how]

It happens that this Defendant was

But before the case arose, Adam, who happens to come from]

19

a little bit different background than some of the street

20

kids, he comes from a very wealthy family.

21

none of the money himself, his father is extremely wealthy in

22

the State of Texas. And that was known when he was in prison.

23

So if you are wondering why would all of these people come to

24

Adam Black, he has the reputation of at least coming from a

25

family with a lot of money, although Adam doesn't get any of

Although he gets
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it.
And he was in prison.

When he came out of prison, he

began seeing people with whom he had been in prison.

And he

started dropping by Blake Woodring1s office and giving him
information.

You cannot use a parolee as an undercover agent

just on the decision of a parole agent.
the Corrections Department.

It is prohibited by

But because of all of the

information that Adam Black kept giving the Parole Department,
and because of the fact that all of this information was
turning out to be good information, Blake Woodring applied to
the administrative offices in Salt Lake to permit Adam Black
to work undercover.
Now Adam Black requested absolutely nothing of the Parole
Department to this point, to the point that he had been giving
all of this information, including the guy from Oregon, had
asked for absolutely nothing.

Blake Woodring said to Adam, I

am going to apply to let you be an undercover agent because of
all of the information that you seem to be able to get. And
all of the information that you may be able to get in the
future.

But you will not do this for nothing.

agents work for nothing.

We donft have

So if you go to work as an

undercover agent for us, we will pay off.

And this is

basically the agreement they have with him, $195.00 in
restitution that he still owed on the burglary that he had
gone to prison on.

Plus he will get money for gas, because
67
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ADDENDUM B

Blake Vfoodring's Direct testimony
cxancerning Adam Black

1
2
3

Mr. Black has never had a positive urine sample.

Q

All right.

Now in January of 1995—I assume that

your relationship with Mr. Black between October of '94 and

4
5

A

January of '95 was the standard parole officer?
||

A

He was on I.S.P. which is intensive supervision,

6

which requires more home visits, more office visits. And he

7

was on that for a period of six months when he was first

8

II released.

9

Q

10

In January, though, of 1995, did your relationship

with Mr. Black change?

11

A

Yes.

12

||

Q

Describe for the Jury what happened in that time?

13

II

A

In January of 1995 Mr. Black came into my office.

14

He informed me at that time that he had a person staying with

15

him off and on who was a parole fugitive and probation

16

fugitive.

17

and probation fugitive from Salt Lake City.

18

forged checks at that time. He stated that this individual

19

had shown him how he was doing it, and was cashing checks now

20

in the Ogden area.

21
22
23
24
25

He was a parole fugitive from the State of Oregon
He was cashing

He was aware that Mr.—that the individual's name was
Raymond Lindbrick, had done about ten checks here in the Ogden
area.

One of those checks he was able to obtain a brand new

Toyota Corolla. Mr. Black gave me information where he was
hanging out, the various drug houses he was going to to
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purchase substances.
Based upon the information Mr. Black provided to me, I
was able to do surveillance and find the individual.

Followed!

his vehicle, pulled it over, and took him into custody.

And

confiscated evidence that led to convictions in the States of
Washington, Oregon and Utah.
Q

Did you receive any award for that?

A

Yes, I did.

I received a medal of merit provided by|

the Department of Corrections.
Q

Now so the Jury knows, and some of them might know,

you are a category 1 police officer?
A

I am.

Q

Parole and probation supervising officers in Utah

are peace officers?
A

The majority of them are.

Q

Okay.

And you were in that position, is that

correct?
A

Uh-huh.

I finished the Police Academy in December

of f94.
Q

So much of what you do is basically police work?

A

Correct.

Q

In supervising these people.

A

That's right.

Q

All right.

Now after January of 1995 when this

information was given to you, did Adam Black continue to give
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you information?
A

He did*

Mr. Black has a unique ability to talk to

people and gain their trust.

Over the next few months he

would let me know—he would come and ask me if certain
individuals were on the run, if they were fugitives from
justice, and provided me information on various fugitives in
the Ogden area.
Q

Did that information turn out to be correct or

incorrect insofar as you were able to check it?
A

The majority of the time it was correct information.

Usually—at that time they had started the NUCAT, the Northern]
Utah Criminal Apprehension Team.
Q

You better tell the Jury what that is, just very

quickly.
A

It is run by the F.B.I. An enforcement agency made

up of officers from the various agencies in the Weber-Davis
County areas. And their main job is to chase fugitives that
are on the run on probation and parole and failure to appear
in court.
Q

And was that information that he was giving you

leading to the capture of people?
A

Oh some occasions, yes. The other occasions it

didn't materialize.
Q

Did you ever find he wasn't telling the truth?

A

No, I found his statements to be true.
94
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ADDENDUM C

1

monitoring the bug and paying attention to Adam.

2

specifically—that's what he was doing.

3

|

4
6

Q

Now were you there when—did Lyle eventually

get to that store?
||

7
8

||

9

" day?

10

Okay.

That was

II

11

A

Yes, he did.

Q

And did you see Lyle go in there?

A

I did see Lyle go in.

Q

Did you have any more to do with this case on that

A
Q

No.
And have you had any more to do with Adam Black as

12

|| pertains to this defendant since that day?

13

||

14

" have also dealt with Ray up to the point he went back to the

A

15

prison

16

Q

17
18
19

Well, with Adam, yes.

Okay.

I have dealt with Adam.

I

You didn't make any more buys from him after

that insofar as you know?
A

As far as I know, there was one additional buy, but

the clarity there is, you know—•

20

Q

Did you continue to work Adam?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

How many different casess?

23

A

Numerous different cases.

24

Q

How many different times did you go along like you

25

have described on these two cases?
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Rodney Laplant's Direct Testimony
concerning Adam Black

A

Just about every one of them.

two or three, maybe not even that many.

I think I only misse^
I mean I was there

on—I was one of the controlling officers through the whole
thing*
Q

And Adam did a lot of people?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Is that fair?

A

Yeah, he did.

He did a lot of people.

Not just in

that one area, but he did numerous people in Ogden.
Q

And many of them are now in prison?

A

Yes.
MR. DAINES:

Thank you, nothing further.

THE COURT: Cross.
MR. MILES:

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MILES:
Q

Mr. Laplant, you indicated that through your fault,

or whatever, no report was prepared, no notes were taken, that}
type of thing, is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

Why—tell me again why on something like this you

don't—obviously it is numerous months since this occurred,
wouldn't it be helpful to have a report or some notes to refeif
to?
A

It would be very helpful.
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ADDENDUM D

Defendant's Opening Argument

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I want to thank you in
advance for the time and for your consideration in listening
to the evidence here today.

I am representing Mr. Perez,

Raymond Perez, who ve anticipate you will hear later on either]
today or tomorrow state what happened.

He was there on

occasions and he knows what happened.
You won't hear other witnesses.
8

That we anticipate at

I this time, due to the fact that this was a situation where

9

this Defendant knew Adam Black, he lived by the Red Duck where]

10

this took place, he would state that he was there a number of

11

times.

12

familiar with Mr. Black and with other individuals around

13

there.

His apartment was up the hill from that.

He is very

It was not surprising for him to be in that area. Anq

14

I you will hear him explain that.

15

"

We ar here today.

It is the State's burden obviously, as]

16

the Judge indicated, to prove Mr. Perez is guilty beyond a

17

reasonable doubt.

18

It is our job to make sure that the evidence that the State

19

has is not just given to you and our version, or Mr. Perez'

20

version of what happened is not left for you to wonder what

21

happened.

22

tell you, even though it is the State's burden to prove him

23

guilty.

24
25

It is not our job to prove him innocent.

He is going to take the stand, and he is going to

Initially, Ladies and Gentlemen, you will hear that Mr.
Perez did meet this confidential informant—and frankly that
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is where the case comes down to. Who do you want to believe,
the confidential informant, who Mr. Daines from the State
indicated has been in prison.

He has been there on a burglary)

charge. And he is now out of prison.

And he is passing this

information along to the State.
Either he is telling the truth or Mr. Perez is telling
the truth, that he did not do these things which the
confidential informant is saying he did do those things. This]
is basically what this comes down to, Ladies and Gentlemen.
The information that you will hear from Mr. Perez, the
testimony that he will give, is that he did live at 2560
Adams, apartment number 4. And that is critical when we get
into the evidence.

You will see that the reports made by the

officers, the information given by the confidential informant
is not consistent.

There are discrepancies in the apartment

number they go to. And I think you heard Mr. Daines indicate
well maybe one report it said number 2, but he does live in
number 4.

Those are the issues that are going to be important]

here today.

Mr. Perez does live at 2560 Adams, number four,

which is right up the street from the Red Duck convenience
store.
You will hear him indicate that he was in the convenience!
store a number of times. That he did know Adam from prison.
Not very well. You will hear him indicate that he remembers
him, knows who he was, but it wasn't like they had an
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acquaintance where they would get together after.

This was a

situation that he recognized or knew Mr. Black, the
confidential informant, when he went into the Red Duck.

But

he did spend a lot of time there going in and out.
But you will also hear that Mr. perez has never been
involved in drug offenses, has never been convicted or charged|
with any drug offenses. And that he did not on these two
occasions the State is indicating, did not in any way
participate in selling drugs to the confidential informant.
Again, it is not our burden to prove that he did not sell|
these drugs. There may be some questions as to why the
confidential informant would make the accusations against the
Defendant, against Mr. Perez. The State in their testimony,
and from what Mr. Daines has indicated in his opening, is that]
he just is doing this just basically to be a good guy.

That

he is the one that approached his parole officer and said,
hey, I want to do some of this stuff.
Well, frankly the information that he has given, what he
is getting in return is getting restitution paid off, is
getting off parole, those type of things are things in return.
Now whether the State wants you to understand that he
didn't anticipate getting any of these things or not, those
are motives. Those are reasons why this confidential
informant, who hasn't had an honest background, would have
possibly to say and do these things, because of the
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1

I convenience that presented itself.

2

"

3
4

On the first occasion which they have charged, which is
alleged to have occurred on October 30th, the information that|
we were given is this occurred at 2560 Porter number 2,

5

apartment number 2. That is not where the Defendant lives.

6

The Defendant lives at 2560 Adams apartment number 4.

7

information coming directly from the confidential informant

8

who supposedly went into this apartment.

9

This is|

Again, you won't hear testimony from anyone else other

10

than the confidential informant that Mr. perez was in this

11

apartment number 2. And he is the one that he got the drugs

12

from.

13

say, yes, I saw Mr. Perez there.

14

drugs.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

There is no other witnesses that are going to come and
He is the one that gave the

So again, it comes down to whether this confidential
informant is actually telling the truth.

The way these drug

buys, as they call it go down, presents itself to having to
trust a confidential informant in a situation like this, tfhatl
if he was in there and was to get the drugs from someone else
and come out and say he got them from Mr. Perez or another
individual?

That's what the agents and whoever is monitoring

the situation goes by.
You will not hear a tape that is played that will have
Mr. Perez' voice on it.

That would be fairly easy to do if in

fact this went down the way they said it did.

If they are
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monitoring it, and in fact presented him with a tape to record]
it, where is it?

We could all decide for ourselves once Mr.

Perez takes the stand if that is his voice. And you could
make the decision based on that.
So again, we are left to Mr. Black, what he said is the
way it went down. Well, that is not the way it went down. Hej
is the only one who saw him supposedly on the first occasion.
And he does not even give the correct information as to where
Mr. Perez lives or the apartment number.

Now whether he did

this in apartment number 2, or other individuals were
involved, I am not here to say.

But it did not happen the way]

he said it happened.
On the second occasion again, which was some, oh, two
weeks later, on November 13th, when you heard Mr. Daines
explain the controlled buy supposedly at the Red Duck
convenience store. Mr. Perez is not going to deny he was in
the Red Duck.

There is no question that he was there. He was

there two or three times a week he indicated.

So that may

very well have happened that he was in there on the occasion
that Mr. Bayless saw him in the store on the occasion.
But again we are left to Mr. Bayless leaving and the
confidential informant dealing directly with Mr. Perez. And
the situation going down the way that the confidential
informant says it goes down.
Again, as they indicated, a tape was made. Well, there
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1

is no tape.

And maybe something happened to the tape.

2

they didn't push the record button.

3

happened.

4

II store.

6

I

7

But again we are left to listen to Mr. Black give

As he said, there was a number of people coming in and
out all the time he was making buys left and right.

|| knows, maybe some controlled, maybe some on his own.

9
10

I don't know what

his version of how it occurred at the Red Duck convenience

5

8

Maybe

Who
I don't

know what—who the other individuals were that were in there.
||

But on the second offense as Mr. Daines even indicates
before they could even speak with Mr. Perez—or excuse me,

12

|| with the confidential informant about this supposed drug buy

13

|| that went down with Mr. Perez, another individual came in and

14

sold the confidential informant drugs.

15

drugs to the Strike Force after this happened is not proof

16

beyond a reasonable doubt that it was from—Mr. Perez whom he

17

got these drugs from.

18

to the confidential informant and trust what he says.

19

he someone that we want to trust, and we want to believe

20

beyond a reasonable doubt that this is the way it happened?

Because he turns over

So again we are left to listen to Mr.—|
And is

21

The testimony that we have, Ladies and Gentlemen, we

22

don't have ten or twelve witnesses to put on the stand to back!

23

up anything that Mr. Perez says.

24

happened, there would be nobody available, no one to do that.

25

They are accusing him of doing something which he did not do.

Because frankly the way this
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He is not denying he goes in the Red Duck.
denying he lives in apartment number 4.

He is not

So you will hear him

testify he is not involved in selling the confidential
informant drugs.
And based upon the inaccuracies and discrepancies in the
way the reports were made, and the way the information was
relayed from the confidential informant to the officers, that
there are a number of inconsistencies that just don't jibe
into having Mr. Perez be found guilty of these offenses.
And it is your job as Jurors to make that determination,
to decide if it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
based upon the testimony that you will hear.
Thank you.
THE COURT: All right, Members of the Jury, we are
going to take a lunch recess at this point.
reconvene at 1:30.

We are going to

Part of the reason we take that time is

there is some other business that the Court has to take care
of during the lunch hour.
I again need to admonish you not to discuss the case with
anyone during the break.

You are free to have lunch with one

another. And you are not required to stay together as a Jury.
You can go on your own way.

If you eat lunch together or go

with someone else, you are not to discuss among yourselves
what you have heard from the attorneys in their opening
statements.
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